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Richard Bruce Kishpaughf Defendant-Appellant

(Kishpaugh),

by and through his attorneys of record/ pursuant to Rule 24(c)
and Rule 27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby submits
his Repy Brief
A

William

in response

Kornmayer's

to certain new matters raised

and Kathryn Kornmayer's

in

(Petitioners),

Respondents f Br ief.

SCOPE OF ARGUMENT
This

Reply

Brief

will

cover

only

raised in Respondents' Brief; viz,,

certain

new

matters

Substantial compliance

with the Hutchinson standing will not support a conclusion of
rebuttal

of

the

parental

presumption;

B,

Brian's

express

preference cannot support an award of custody; C. Petitioners
correctly point out Kishpaugh has been effectively divested of
his right ever to obtain custody of Brian; and D. Petitioners
erroneously conclude Kishpaugh intentionally misled the Court,

ARGUMENT
A,
DOES

NOT

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUTCHINSON STANDARD
SUPPORT

A

CONCLUSION

OF

REBUTTAL

OF

THE

PARENTAL

PRESUMPTION.
Petitioners •agrue the trial court was in "substantial
compliance"
1982),

with the Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah

standard

in

basing

its

conclusion

that

the

parental

presumption had been rebutted on a finding Kishpaugh lacked two
of

the three characteristics

pronged

Hutchinson

test,

listed as elements of the three(Respondents1 Brief at 5),

The

Hutchinson standard does not call for "substitutional compliance"
or

"two out of

three".

characteristics

that give

must be missing.

Hutchinson
rise

states

to the

649 P.2d at 41;

"all three of the

[parental] presumption"

Cooper v. Deland, 652 P.2d at

908.
The standard actually applied by the trial court was not
even

in

"substantial

compliance"

with

Hutchinson.

At

the

beginning of the trial, the court stated:

THE COURT: Well, lets not argue. I'm not going to
argue it right now. I'm going to look in this case as
the issue of one, I guess there is a presumption that
the nature parents should have the child.
MR. HAYES:

That is correct.

THE COURT: Assume that's the case, the good Lord
gave it to them, why should I be involved in changing
that.
Two, then I've got to look at the next thing
which is assuming both sides are equally competent,
equally capable, equally reliable in taking care of the
child; without any evidence of one side having some
pluses or minuses insofar as the child is concerned.
Then I've got to look at what is the child's best
interest, what would the child like to do, where would
the child be best and what would be for the best
interests of the child. Who can best take care of this
child.
And I think that when I get through with the
whole thing that's the kind of position, who can best
take care of this child.
Now, I'm going to kind of
restrict to that area. Okay?
(T 9-10)
Later,

in

its memorandum

decision, the

trial court

is

silent on the question of whether the parental presumption had
been rebutted.

As to the standard actually applied, it stated:

^

The real issue in this case is what is for the
best interest of Brian (see Cooper v. Delandf 652
P. 2d 907 and Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d
38).
After
much
consideration,
this
court
concludes that it is for the best interest of Brian
that Mr. and Mrs. William Kornmayer be granted
custody of Brian for the present time.
(Respondents1 Brief, Appendix B, at 2-3)
B.

BRIAN'S EXPRESS PREFERENCE CANNOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF

CUSTODY TO PETITIONERS.
Petitioners have made much of Brian's express preference
to continue to live with Petitioners and Ona Landrum.
finding

thereof by the trial court

From a

(F.F. 9) , Petitioners have

inferred both that the parental presumption had been rebutted,
that Brian's best interests favor awarding custody to Petitioners
(Respondents' Brief at 4-5), and that Kishpaugh should never be
awarded custody of Brian (Respondents' Brief at 9 ) .
Too
Brian

has

much

lived

divorce in 1981.

is made
with

Ona

of

this

Landrum

expression
and

of

Petitioners

He was then five years old.

preference.
since

the

Since that time he

has lived with Ona Landrum in her home during the week and with
Petitioners

in their trailer on the weekends.

For four years

Brain saw his mother and father only on visits: his father more
frequently than his mother.
It comes as no surprise that Brian, or any other eight
and one-half year old boy, would express a preference for living

where he has lived the past four years.

Even though it is clear

that Brian loves his father very much and has established a home
of sorts

in Reno

(Respondents' Brief, Appendix E f

at 1-3), he

prefers to live where he has lived.
This

preference

should

not

be

wholly

determinative.

Plaintiff's preference placed Brian in Ona Landrum's home, not
Brian's.

Plaintiff's preference kept him there for four years.

Naturally Brian developed a preference for the place he has lived
half of his young life.
Kishpaugh

This preference does not indicate that

lacks typical parental characteristics, that Brian's

best interests are best served by his remaining with Petitioners
or that Kishpaugh should never obtain custody.

This preference

indicates only Brian's normal attachment to the familiar.

C.

PETITIONERS

EFFECTIVELY

DIVESTED

CORRECTLY
OF

HIS

POINT OUT KISHPAUGH

RIGHT

EVER

TO

OBTAIN

HAS

BEEN

CUSTODY

OF

BRIAN.
Petitioners

point

out

in

response

to

point

C

Kishpaugh's argument (Appellants' Brief at 8-10):
It would be a great hardship for Brian if
custody was to be changed at a later date because
the Defendant had somehow "redeemed" himself, for
example, by visiting and writing more often, and by
paying his child support.
None of those things
change the fact that the longer Brian stays with
the Petitioners, the more bonded be will become,
and the more difficult it would be for him to leave
his home and friends. [Emphasis added]
(Respondents' Brief at 9 ) .

of

The

very

admit to.

wrong

Kishpaugh

complains

of

the

Petitioners

In large part, the trial court based its decision on

the fact that Brian has lived with Petitioners for four years,
(T 135)

and

upon

Brian's

express preference, as noted

above.

These matters are outside Kishpaugh's control and, as Petitioners
stated, "the longer Brian stays with the Petitioners, the more
bonded he will become", and the less likely Kishpaugh will ever
be able to acquire custody.

Thus, under the standard apparently

followed by the trial court, nothing Kishpaugh can ever do will
enable him to regain custody of Brian.

D.

PETITIONERS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE KISHPAUGH

INTENTIONALLY MISLED THIS COURT.
Petitioner pointed out (Respondents' Brief at 10), that
in Kishpaugh's Brief, it states incorrectly that the trial court
in Cooper v. DeLand, 652 P. 2d 902 (Utah 1982) awarded custody of
an eight year old to the stepfather upon petition for custody by
the

noncustodial

natural

father

following

the

death

of

the

natural mother. (Appellant's Brief at 4 ) .
Petitioners

argue

that

Kishpaugh,

thus,

"attempts

to

wilfully mislead the Court as [sic] the disposition of [Cooper]"
(Respondents' Brief at 10).
cites

Cooper

standard

to

applies

nonparents.

support
in

In Cooper

This is not the case.

his

custody
the

proposition

that

disputes

between

trial court erred

-A_

the

Kishpaugh
Hutchinson

parents

in applying

and
an

incorrect legal standard, much as the trial court in the instant
case has erred.
Any
counsel.

errors

in

Kishpaugh's

Brief

are

those

of

his

They are not intended to mislead this Court, but are

only the result of Kishpaugh's counsel's unfortunate misreading
of

the

facts

of

Cooper.

A

copy

of

the Cooper

decision

is

attached as Appendix D.

CONCLUSION
Substantial compliance with the Hutchinson standard will
not support a conclusion of rebuttal of the parental presumption.
The standard

requires all three characteristics to be missing,

not merely two of three.
otherwise.
considered

The trial court erred in concluding

Second, Brian's preference is but one factor to be
among

many

Third, Petitioners

have

in

establishing

agreed

Kishpaugh

his

"best

interests".

has been

effectively

divested of his right ever to obtain custody of Brian and Brian
has been effectively divested of his right to be raised by this
natural parent.

This was error.

Respectfully Submitted this

^>i

day of

^ 7 ^
\ ^

1985.
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHARREN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
By; —<S^\v^/vt^3M^v^\ - ^ y u v u ,

- 7-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the 3/

day of

1985, true and correct copies of the foregoing

/^/,

Reply Brief

were

served upon Jane Allen, Attorney for Respondents, at 73 5 Judge
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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safety of others by driving erratically and
on the wrong side of the traffic divider in
his efforts to elude pursuers. We therefore
hold that substantial evidence supported
the jury in finding that the state had established both the act and the intent components of attempted first degree murder by
defendant.
[4] The instructions to the jury correctly described the elements of attempted first
degree murder and defined the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" in precisely
the language used by the Utah Criminal
Code.9 The instructions also correctly stated:
You are instructed that in every crime
or public offense there must be a union or
joint operation of the act and intent.
The intent or intention is manifested by
the circumstances connected with the offense and the sound'mind and discretion
of the accused.
All presumptions of law, independent
of evidence, are in favor of innocence,
and a defendant is innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
And in case of a reasonable doubt as to
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to be found not guilty.
Having received proper instruction concerning the act and intent requirements for
the crime charged and the applicable standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it
lay within the province of the jury to decide
the factual question of whether the state
had met this standard of proof. Because
substantial evidence supported the jury's
guilty verdict, the trial court erred in interfering with the jury's exercise of its factfinding role. We order that the verdict be
reinstated.
Reversed.
STEWART, OAKS and HOWE, JJ„ and
DAVID B. DEE, District Judge, concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein; DEE, District Judge, sat.
9. U C A , 1953, 76-2-103(1), (2).

Michael J. COOPER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Walter DeLAND, Richard Vigor, et aL,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18101.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 26. &82.

Natural father of minor child brought
action against minor's maternal grandparents, maternal uncles and aunts, and stepfather, seeking appointment as guardian of
the minor. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered
judgment in favor of natural father, and
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held
that case had to be remanded to the trial
court with instructions to enter findings on
whether parental presumption had been
overcome and on the best interests of the
child.
Remanded.

1. Parent and Child <s=»2(8)
Presumption that child's best interests
are most adequately served by granting
custody to natural parent is not conclusive.
2. Parent and Child <s=>2(3.1, 8)
Party seeking to deprive a natural parent of custody of a minor child can rebut
parental presumption only by evidence establishing that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a
willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the child's interest and
welfare, and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child
that is characteristic of parents generally;
only after parental presumption has been
rebutted, will parties compete on equal

908
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footing, and custody shall then be granted
to party who will most adequately protect
and promote the best interests of the child.
3. Parent and Child <s=>2(20)
Custody dispute between minor child's
natural father and stepfather had to be
remanded to trial court with instructions to
enter findings on whether parental presumption had been overcome and on the
best interests of the child.
David S. Dolowitz of Parsons, Behle &
Latimer, Salt Lake City, for defendants and
appellants.
Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a custody dispute between a minor chiJd's natura) father and
stepfather.
Plaintiff-respondent, Michael J. Cooper, is
the natural father of a minor child, born
July 22, 1973, as the issue of his marriage
with Lisa DeLand. The marriage terminated in divorce in 1975, and Lisa DeLand was
granted custody of the minor child. Lisa
DeLand married the defendant-appellant,
Richard Vigor, on July 24, 1980. Lisa DeLand Vigor died on October 13, 1980. The
respondent initiated this action against the
minor's maternal grandparents, maternal
uncles and aunts, and appellant, seeking
custody of his son. The defendants filed a
counterclaim, seeking to have the appellant
appointed as the guardian of the minor.
The trial court determined that neither
the appellant nor the respondent was unfit
to have custody of the minor child. However, the court ruled that the appellant had
failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was not in the best interests
of the minor to be placed in the custody of
his natural father. Thus, the trial court
granted custody to the minor's natural father, with an order that the minor's maternal grandparents be granted reasonable visitation privileges. On appeal, the appellant
alleges that the trial court erred when it
required the defendants to meet the "clear

and convincing evidence" standard set out
in In re Castillo, Utah, 632 P.2d 855 (1981).
This Court stated in Castillo that a party
seeking to deprive the natural parent of his
parental rights must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that it is not in the
best interests of the child to reside with his
natural parent. Id. at 857. Appellant
claims that since the present case involves a
custody dispute rather than a permanent
termination of parental rights, the Castillo
standard does not apply here.
After this appeal was filed, this Court
refined the standard adopted in Castillo in
regard to cases involving permanent termination of all parental rights. In In re J.P.,
Utah, 648 P.2d 1364 (1982), we stated that
before a natural parent can be permanently
deprived of all parental rights, it must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent is unfit, abandoning, or
substantially neglectful. However, In re
J.P. was carefully limited to cases involving
permanent termination of parental rights,
and does not extend to cases involving custody disputes.
[1] In another recent case, Hutchison v.
Hutchison, Utah, 649 P.2d 38 (1982), this
Court set out the standard to be applied in
custody disputes. In Hutchison, we reaffirmed the position that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in a custody dispute, and that those interests are
presumed to be most adequately served by
granting custody to the natural parent.
However, as stated in Hutchison, the parental presumption is not conclusive.
[2] A party seeking to deprive a natural
parent of custody of a minor child can rebut
the parental presumption only by evidence
establishing that: "no strong mutual bond
exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own
interest and welfare for the child's, and
that the parent lacks the sympathy for and
understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally." Only after the
parental presumption has been rebutted,
will the parties compete on equal footing,
and custody shall then be granted to the

JACOBSON v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INS. CO.

Utah 909
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party who will most adequately protect and
promote the best interests of the child. For
the factors that may be considered in determining the child's best interests, see Hutchison.
[3] The standard applied by the trial
court in the instant case is not in conformity with that adopted in Hutchison. The
case is therefore remanded to the trial court
with instructions to enter findings consistent with the holding in Hutchison. Pending further disposition of this matter in the
trial court, custody of the minor child shall
remain with his natural father, the respondent herein.
No costs awarded.

where language on receipt governing temporary life insurance policy clearly set forth
requirement to complete a medical examination, insured was agent of defendant insurer and was aware of condition precedent
but failed to complete medical examination
before his death and insured's physician did
not become an agent for insurer when he
cashed sight draft sent by insurer so as to
shift risk to insurer as doctor was independently selected by insured to provide information on insurance forms and was thereby
responsible to him only.
Lawrence E. Stevens, John B. Wilson of
Parson, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellant.
Ray R. Christensen of Christensen, Jensen, Kennedy & Powell, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.

Gwen A. JACOBSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 17790.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 27, 1982.
Personal representative of estate of insured appealed summary judgment of the
Sixth District Court, Sanpete County,
George E. Ballif, J., dismissing action to recover proceeds of temporary binder of life
insurance. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that insurer was not liable under temporary binder.
Affirmed.
Insurance <s=» 132(2)
Insurer was not liable to personal representative of estate of deceased insured
under temporary life insurance binder

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Gwen A. Jacobson, as personal
representative of the estate of Rawlin Jacobson, appeals a summary judgment which
dismissed her action to recover the proceeds
of a temporary binder of life insurance.
The basis for the appeal is that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as would
preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Rawlin Jacobson was president and chairman of the board of the Utah Independent
Bank of Salina and president of the Bank
of Ephraim. He was also an agent for
defendant Kansas City Life Insurance Company and occasionally wrote life insurance
policies covering persons taking out loans
with his bank.
In July, 1978, a public health nurse visited the Bank of Ephraim and took Mr. Jacobson's blood pressure. She informed him
that it was dangerously elevated and recommended that he consult a physician. On
July 18, 1978, Dr. Bruce Harless examined
Mr. Jacobson's eyes, ears, nose, throat, thyroid, heart and lungs, took his blood pressure and performed a computer blood analysis. Although the blood pressure reading
was high, Dr. Harless did not diagnose hy-

